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The Employee Free Choice Act's Interest




The subject of robust labor law reform usually generates little
interest with lawmakers. Before 2008, only once in the last 30 years has
major labor law reform captured the attention of Congress.' Yet, in
2009, labor law returned to the congressional forefront with the
Employee Free Choice Act (EFCA). Generally, the proposed legislation
made it easier for unions to organize workers, imposes first contracts
with employers through mandatory interest arbitration, and increases
penalties for employers that violate labor organizing laws.3
The bill is strongly supported by organized labor and opposed in
equal measure by employers.4 Both labor and management have
aggressively lobbied Congress on the issue. In announcing his initial
* J.D. Candidate, 2011, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University; B.A. Political Communications, 2004, George Washington University. I
would like to thank Kim and my parents for their ongoing support. I would also thank
Jarol Manheim, Gary Simpler, Michael McGuire, Stephen Shawe, Art Brewer, Jack
Toner, David Dingee, Phil Wilson, Daniel Yager, Marie MacMillan, Seth Borden, and
Richard Hankins for their assistance with this piece and for advancing my love of labor
law. Any errors are my own.
1. See 1 JOHN E. HIGGINS, JR. ET AL., THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 71-73 (5th ed.
2006).
2. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 11Ith Cong. (2009); Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
3. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CASE AGAINST THE EMPLOYEE FREE
CHOICE ACT 9-10 (2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/assets/wfi/090203
epstein.pdf; DAVID MADLAND & KARLA WALTER, THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT 101:
A PRIMER AND REBUTTAL 1-11 (2009), available at http://www.americanprogressaction.
org/issues/2009/03/pdf/efca_101.pdf.
4. See Steven Greenhouse, After Push for Obama, Unions Seek New Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A33.
5. See id.; see also Steven Greenhouse, Fierce Lobbying Greets Bill to Help
Workers Unionize, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2009, at B3.
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opposition to the bill in the spring of 2009, Senator Arlen Specter said
that EFCA was the "most heavily lobbied issue I can recall."6
Despite the importance of this legislation to both labor and
management, some EFCA provisions have received scant attention. A
section of the bill that practically eliminates secret ballot elections and
allows unions to organize with the "card check" method has attracted
considerable debate.7 Much less has been written about arguably the
most important aspect of the legislation-a provision that would mandate
binding government interest arbitration in private sector first contracts
when the parties cannot reach a traditional negotiated settlement. Few
scholars have explored how this arbitration would work in practice and
whether this type of arbitration is desirable as an alternative to the
present system.9
This Comment will explore these issues in greater detail. Part II
will review the history of collective bargaining in the United States, the
central provisions of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 0 that
EFCA would impact, and the Supreme Court's traditional interpretation
of these provisions. Part III will examine the union critique of the
NLRA, how EFCA supposedly cures these defects, and management's
response. Part IV traces the concept of interest arbitration and the
different types of interest arbitration currently used. Part V analyzes
why-beyond public reasons-unions are seeking interest arbitration.
Part VI argues that interest arbitration is not necessary because it is
contrary to traditional collective bargaining, would unfairly tilt the labor
relations playing field in organized labor's direction, and unions
themselves should be forced to undertake internal reforms before
implementing such a drastic remedy. Part VII will discuss practical
concerns with interest arbitration and competing views on how the
6. Press Release, Senator Arlen Specter, Senator Specter Speaks on Employee Free
Choice Act/Card Check (March 24, 2009), available at http://specter.senate.gov (type
"Employee Free Choice Act" in keyword search; then click on result "Senator Specter
Speaks on Employee Free Choice Act/Card Check").
7. See, e.g., Raja Raghunath, Stacking the Deck: Privileging Employer Free Choice
Over Industrial Democracy in the Card-Check Debate, 87 NEB. L. REv. 329, 330-36,
367-70 (2008); Bruce A. Miller & Ada A. Verloren, Workers Free Choice: An
Unrealized Promise, 54 WAYNE L. REv. 869, 870-76 (2008).
8. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009);
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); see also EPSTEIN,
supra note 3, at 51 (calling interest arbitration the "most radical transformation in
American labor law.").
9. The most comprehensive articles written on this subject are David Broderdorf,
Overcoming The First Contract Hurdle: Finding a Role for Mandatory Interest
Arbitration in the Private Sector, 23 LAB. LAW. 323 (2008) and Catherine Fiske & Adam
Pulver, First Contract Arbitration and the Employee Free Choice Act, 70 LA. L. REV. 47
(2009) [hereinafter Fiske].
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
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process would actually work in the private sector. Part VIII will offer
some concluding thoughts.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF LABOR RELATIONS IN AMERICA
A. Early Labor Relations Law
The earliest battles in America between labor and management are
marked by clear victories for employers and outright judicial hostility
towards the right of workers to organize. In the early 19th century,
workers who organized were often prosecuted under state criminal
conspiracy laws.' 1  These prosecutions subsided after workers were
acquitted in Commonwealth v. Hunt.12 In that case, the Massachusetts
Supreme Court found that in order for workers to be prosecuted under
criminal conspiracy doctrines, the workers must either have an illegal
purpose or resort to illegal means.13 Still, judicial decisions varied wildly
after Hunt and "the economic sophistication and bias of an individual
judge were often pivotal."I4
Even with the lack of judicial protection, organized labor activity
increased after the Civil War, spurred by the industrial revolution.15 To
combat the growing influence of unions, employers used judicial
injunctions to end strikes and the judiciary often complied with
management's request. 16 The judiciary also dealt labor a stunning blow
when the Supreme Court held that the Sherman Antitrust Act was
applicable to labor unions as well as corporations. 7
These judicial defeats and increasing labor disruptions prompted
Congress and the Executive Branch to act. Congress passed, and
presidents signed, a string of pro-labor union bills through the late 19th
and early 20th centuries including: the Erdman Act,18 which provided
for the resolution of railroad labor disputes; the Clayton Antitrust Act,19
which limited antitrust laws' applicability to union activity; the Railway
Labor Act,20 which expanded the Erdman Act and provided support for
11. See 1 HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 4.
12. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. I 11(1842).
13. See id. at 126.
14. See 1 HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 6.
15. See DOUGLAS E. RAY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING LABOR LAW 4-5 (2nd ed. 2005).
16. See id. at 6.
17. See generally Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274 (1908).
18. Erdman Act, 30 Stat. 424 (1898) (invalidated by Adair v. U.S., 208 U.S. 161
(1908)).
19. Clayton Antitrust Act, 38 Stat. 737 (1914) (codified throughout 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-
27 (2006) and 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53 (2006)).
20. Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-164 (2006). In an important act of
foreshadowing, the Supreme Court upheld the Railway Labor Act, writing, "[Tjhe
2010] 213
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21collective bargaining on the railways; and the Norris-LaGuardia Act,
which prohibited federal courts from issuing labor injunctions.
B. The National Labor Relations Act
In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act,22 a
wide-ranging and comprehensive piece of labor legislation that even 70
years later is universally regarded as the seminal moment in American
labor relations.2 3 The bill was led through Congress by New York
Senator Robert Wagner and, to this day, is dubbed by labor lawyers as
the "Wagner Act."24
21
The NLRA's most important provision can be found in Section 7,
which explicitly provides for the right to organize and bargain
collectively.26 In order to enforce Section 7, the NLRA established the
National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), a quasi-judicial tribunal and
administrative agency.27 The Board was empowered to issue unfair labor
practices against management and eventually unions for violations of the
law. 28
Generally, EFCA's greatest impact is on Section 9(e) 29 and 8(d) 0 of
the NLRA. Section 9(e) pertains to the union certification process and
requirement for government supervised secret ballot elections if 30
percent or more of employees petition the employer for union
representation.31 Section 8(d) mandates the duty to bargain, stating that
both the union and employer must "meet at reasonable times and confer
legality of collective action on the part of employees to safeguard their proper interest is
not to be disputed." Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Ry. & S.S. Clerks, 281
U.S. 548, 570 (1930).
21. Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115.
22. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
23. See 1 HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 29-34 ("[T]he Act was the starting point
for contemporary American labor law.").
24. Wagner himself can be either largely thanked or blamed for the passage of the
NLRA. Despite its progressive inclinations, the Roosevelt White House was neutral
through much of the debate and several high-ranking administration officials even
opposed the bill. See Leon H. Keyserling, The Wagner Act: Its Origin and Current
Significance, 29 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 199,203-04 (1960).
25. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
26. Id.
27. Id. §§ 153-156.
28. Id.
29. Id. § 159(e).
30. Id. § 158(d).
31. Id. § 159(e). If the employees present a majority of signed authorization cards to
the employer, the employer retains the option to immediately recognize the union. See 1
HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 559-61. In practice, this is rarely done and employers
almost always insist on a secret ballot election, unless they are pressured to agree to card
check through a corporate campaign. See infra pp. 37-43.
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in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.... [B]ut such obligation does not compel
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
,,32concession.
The problem of how to solve stalled contract negotiations and the
extent to which the government can intervene, which EFCA's interest
arbitration provision addresses, was a significant consideration in the
original NLRA debate.33 Some Senators feared that the duty to bargain
in the NLRA combined with the new NLRB would give the federal
government the power to impose contract terms.34 However, Senator
Walsh made it profoundly clear that the original NLRA was not
delegating this broad power to the federal government, stating:
Let me say that the bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to
make any agreement, to reach any understanding with any employee
or group of employees. Nothing in this bill allows the Federal
Government or any agency to fix wages, to regulate rates of pay, to
limit hours of work, or to effect or govern working conditions in any
establishment or place of employment.3 5
C. The Supreme Court Interprets the NLRA
In an early Supreme Court case that addressed Section 8(d), NLRB
v. American National Insurance Co., 36 the Court held that Section 8(d)
did not permit the NLRB to require contract concessions.3 7 Despite this
legislative history and judicial interpretation, some controversy ensued as
to whether or not the NLRB retained power to set contract terms. The
key case to eventually decide this issue was H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB.38
In that case, a company and union were involved in protracted
negotiations over a contract provision that would automatically deduct
union dues from employee paychecks. 3 9  The company repeatedly
32. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The original NLRA only contained a provision that
employers must "bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees" on pay,
wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment. See 1 HIGGINS ET AL.,
supra note 1, at 823. In the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, the duty for
both parties to bargain in good faith was made explicitly clear in Section 8(d). See id. at
825.
33. See I HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 823-24.
34. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1970) (citing 79 Cong. Rec.
S. 7659 (1935)).
35. Id.
36. NLRB v. Am. Nat. Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395 (1952).
37. See id. at 402.
38. H.K. Porter Co., 397 U.S. at 99.
39. See id. at 100.
2010] 215
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refused this request. 40 The NLRB sided with the union and issued an
order granting a contract clause for the check-off of union dues. 4 1 In a 5-
422 decision, the Supreme Court reversed in favor of the employer. The
Court held that the object of the NLRA "was not to allow government
regulation of the terms and conditions of employment." 4 3 The Court,
citing Senator Walsh approvingly,44 disavowed any government ability to
set contract terms, holding that, "But it was recognized from the
beginning that agreement might in some cases be impossible, and it was
never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become
a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable
settlement." 4 5
The decision in H.K Porter relied on another important labor law
case, NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,46 which directly challenged
the constitutionality of the NLRA. 47 The Supreme Court ruled that the
NLRA was constitutional, at least in part because it "does not compel
agreements between employers and employees."4 8
The Court in H.K Porter ultimately concluded that employers and
unions are free to rely on economic strength to secure what they could
not obtain through bargaining and that it would fall upon Congress to
change the NLRA to allow government to compel contract terms.4 9
Other cases since H.K Porter have relied on this important precedence
and similarly limited the NLRB's powers to write a contract,o with the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit even
claiming that the holding from H.K Porter is now an "elementary
principle of law under the NLRA." 5 1
40. See id.
41. See id. at 101-03.
42. See id. at 109.
43. Id. at 103.
44. Id. at 104.
45. Id. at 103-04.
46. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
47. See id. at 25.
48. Id. at 45.
49. See H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 109. It can be argued that EFCA is the legislative
change that the Court spoke of in H.K. Porter.
50. See, e.g., Ex-Cell-O Corp., 185 NLRB 107 (1970). In Ex-Cell-O, the employer
challenged the conduct of the election and refused to bargain with the union. See id. at
107-08. The trial examiner initially ordered the company to compensate its employees
for damages incurred as a result of the employer's refusal to bargain. See id. at 108. The
employer argued that the amount of employee loss was speculative and the remedy
amounted to writing a contract between the employer and union. Id. Relying heavily on
H.K Porter, the NLRB agreed with the employer, holding that the remedy would force
the employer "willy-nilly . . . to accede to terms never mutually established by the
parties." Id. at 109-10.
51. Hyatt Mgmt. Corp. v. NLRB, 817 F.2d 140, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
216 [Vol. 115:1
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The end result of H.K. Porter is that the NLRB is powerless to
compel contract terms in the private sector through Section 8(d). If the
employer and union cannot reach an agreement, either side has the right
to resort to economic warfare, such as the employee's right to strike5 2 or
the employer's right to lockout53 and hire replacement workers. 5 4  In
cases where the employer and union are still unable to reach a final
contract, then a bargaining impasse can be declared." The Board has
described impasse as the point when "further bargaining would be
futile... . Both parties must believe that they are at the end of their
rope."56  Once impasse is reached, the employer can unilaterally
implement its last, final offer provided that any unilateral changes were
included in the final offer to the union and the impasse was reached in
the course of good faith bargaining. Furthermore, the employer may
only implement an offer in a manner that does not disparage the
collective bargaining process and collective bargaining representative.57
If this implemented proposal is still not acceptable to the union and its
members, they are free to strike and cannot be fired for striking.
Strikes or other forms of economic pressure can effectively break an
impasse and lead to a resumption of bargaining. 9 Overall, this process
relies heavily on the parties themselves to seek agreement and leaves
open a variety of economic tools to achieve that goal. Government is
simultaneously relegated to a "referee" role, with no power to write
contract terms.
52. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
53. See generally Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v.
Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
54. See generally NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938).
55. See 1 HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 988; Ellen J. Dannin, Legislative Intent
and Impasse Resolution Under the National Labor Relations Act: Does Law Matter?, 15
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 11, 26-27 (1997).
56. A.M.F. Bowling Co., 314 NLRB 969, 978 (1994).
57. See Dannin, supra note 55, at 25-27.
58. See I HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1003-04; Hi-Way Billboards, Inc., 206
NLRB 1, 3 (1973) ("Once a genuine impasse is reached, the parties can concurrently
exert economic pressure on each other: the union can call for a strike .... "); HARRY C.
KATZ ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 460
(3rd ed. 2005) (defining impasse as "the point in negotiations where no compromise
appears achievable and a strike or lockout is imminent"); RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at
217 ("Employers cannot violate employee rights by threatening to discharge employees
who strike, by discharging employees who strike. . . .").
59. See I HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 1003-04.
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III. THE CURRENT STATE OF LABOR RELATIONS AND EFCA's
ANSWERS
A. EFCA: A Primer
EFCA tries to solve what labor views as Section 8(d)'s deficiency
and other related problems facing unions in organizing workers. EFCA
has three principal components.6o First, the bill would allow for unions
to bypass the Section 9(e) secret ballot election process and form unions
on the basis of signed authorization cards. 6 1 This is commonly referred
to as the "card check" organizing method.62 If 50 percent plus one of the
bargaining unit sign an authorization card, then the union would become
the representative of the workers.63
With regard to the aforementioned contract negotiation problem
under Section 8(d), EFCA would change the current impasse procedure
in first contracts and institute mandatory interest arbitration.
Management and labor would be compelled to negotiate within ten days
of the union's certification.65 If after 90 days an agreement has not been
reached and the parties do not mutually agree to an extension, either
party may ask the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) to
mediate the dispute.66 If after another 30 days, the parties, with FMCS
mediating, still cannot reach a contract agreement, FMCS shall refer the
dispute to an arbitration board. 67  This arbitration board will issue a
binding contract that remains in effect for two years. 68 The final aspect
of EFCA would greatly increase penalties on employers for violating the
NLRA, but does not increase penalties on unions for NLRA violations. 69
60. Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. (2009); Employee
Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560, 111th Cong. (2009).
61. See H.R. 1409 § 2; S. 560 § 2.
62. For a discussion of using signed authorization cards to organize workers, see
generally PETER J. HURTGEN & CHARLES COHEN, MAKING YOUR VOTE COUNTT THE CASE
FOR PRESERVING CONFIDENTIALITY IN EMPLOYEE UNION REPRESENTATION DECISIONS
(2007).
63. See H.R. 1409 § 2(a)(6); S. 560 § 2(a)(6).
64. See H.R. 1409 § 3; S. 560 § 3.
65. See H.R. 1409 § 3; S. 560 § 3.
66. See H.R. 1409 § 3; S. 560 § 3.
67. See H.R. 1409 § 3; S. 560 § 3.
68. See H.R. 1409 § 3; S. 560 § 3.
69. See H.R. 1409 § 4; S. 560 § 4.
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B. Organized Labor's Arguments in Favor ofEFCA
Labor considers passing EFCA its chief legislative priority.7 0 Labor
claims that the traditional NLRA is broken and does not protect unions
from both organizing workers and later negotiating effective first
contracts.7 Unions blame this lack of legal protections for the dramatic
decline in their membership.7 2 In 1954, approximately 34 percent of
eligible private sector workers belonged to a union whereas today that
number stands at 7.2 percent.73 Unions specifically claim that the NLRA
process allows for recalcitrant employers to illegally oppose unions, fire
pro-union workers, hire unsavory anti-union consultants, and unlawfully
stymie the negotiating process.74 In a study that analyzed first contract
negotiations, researchers at the MIT Institute for Work and Employment
Research found that only 56 percent of workers ever received a first
contract and only 38 percent were able to obtain a first contract within
the first year of being certified.75 A further study concluded that during
these initial contract negotiations, "employers engaged in a broad range
of hard or bad-faith bargaining behaviors."7 At least one former NLRB
attorney has concluded that the employer's ability to stall first contracts,
reach impasse, and implement its final-offer is a cloud over the
negotiating process and has "affected every bargaining relationship she
witnessed" while an NLRB employee.
70. See Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A33 ("Labor's No.1 priority is a piece of
legislation called the Employee Free Choice Act. . . .").
71. See Strengthening America's Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice
Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions,
110th Cong. 3, 7 (2007) (statement of Nancy Schiffer, Associate General Counsel, AFL-
CIO).
72. See id.; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 15-16.
73. See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Summary 2009
(Jan. 22, 2010), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm.
74. See Schiffer, supra note 71, at 1-10; see also Kate Bronfenbrenner, Employer
Behavior in Certification Elections and First-Contract Campaigns: Implications for
Labor Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW (Sheldon
Freidman et al. eds., 1994). Bronfenbrenner is a former SEIU organizer and her studies
have been questioned by management on methodological and ethical grounds. See
UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, UNION STUDIES ON EMPLOYER COERCION LACK
CREDIBILITY AND INTEGRITY (2009), available at http://www.uschamber.com/
publications/reports/unionrhetoric.
75. See JOHN-PAUL FERGUSON & THOMAS KOCHAN, SEQUENTIAL FAILURES IN
WORKERS' RIGHT TO ORGANIZE, 1, 1 (2008), available at http://www.americanrights
atwork.org/dmdocuments/sequential failuresin workers right-to-organize 3 25 2008.
pdf; see also John-Paul Ferguson, The Eyes of the Needles: A Sequential Model of Union
Organizing Drives, 1999-2004, 61 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 3, 3-21 (2008).
76. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 74, at 83.
77. Dannin, supra note 55, at 29 n.90.
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C. Employer Counter-Arguments
Employers dispute all of these contentions. 78 First, employers claim
that it is simplistic to attribute the decline in union membership solely to
management's anti-union animus. 79 Epstein cites a litany of other factors
for labor's decline including: the expansion of free trade; more intensive
global competition for employees; the reduced appeal of unions to
younger workers; better wages and working conditions for nonunion
employees; ineffective union organizing; rigidity of unions themselves;
and the fundamental switch in political economy away from a corporatist
economic model.8 0 As for the problems with first contract negotiations,
employers point out that negotiating a first contract is a cumbersome
process and can take months even when all sides are bargaining in good
faith.81  Additionally, "hard-nosed" negotiations can be perfectly
legitimate, as "employers may be engaging in good faith bargaining ...
from a position of solid economic strength. Such a setup is part and
parcel of what free collective bargaining is all about." 82
Turning to the specific solutions proposed by EFCA, employers
contend that the secret ballot process is fair and works well, evidenced
by the fact that unions won about 67 percent of elections in the most
recent year. On mandating interest arbitration in first contracts,
employers claim that interest arbitration would endanger businesses
because government bureaucrats unfamiliar with the economics of a
specific employer would have the power to set private sector
employment contracts.8 4  Furthermore, employers argue that interest
arbitration is unnecessary in the private sector because unions have the
ability to strike and practice other forms of economic warfare. Interest
arbitration was envisioned as an alternative to the right to strike in the
public sector.86 Finally, returning to H.K Porter, employers argue that
78. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 3; UNITED STATES CHAMBER OF COMMERCE,
THE EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE ACT: PIERCING THE RHETORIC (2009), available at
http://www.uschamber.com/publications/reports/0906efca.htm.
79. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 15-16.
80. See id.
81. See PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 24-26.
82. Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 333.
83. See PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 18.
84. See Strengthening America's Middle Class Through the Employee Free Choice
Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health, Employment, Labor and Pensions,
1l0th Cong. 3, 7 (2007) (statement of Charles I. Cohen, Former NLRB Board Member).
85. See PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 22 ("The type of interest
arbitration called for by EFCA was not designed for our private sector free enterprise
system. It was originally developed for the public sector because the playing field was
uneven.. . . In the public sector, unions typically do not have the right to strike.").
86. See id.
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the basis of the American collective bargaining system is the ability of
parties freely to reach an agreement, not to have a contract imposed by
the federal government.87
IV. INTEREST ARBITRATION: AN OVERVIEW
While both union and management have powerful arguments in
favor of and opposed to interest arbitration, the process of interest
arbitration itself deserves explanation.
Interest arbitration is a form of arbitration in which the employment
contract is established by a final and binding decision of an arbitrator or
arbitration panel. 8 Interest arbitration is the writing of a contract,
contrasted with grievance arbitration, which is the interpretation of a
previously written contract.89 Commentators compare interest arbitration
to a legislative process, whereas grievance arbitration is akin to a judicial
process. 90
A. Conventional and Final-Offer Interest Arbitration
Several factors can impact an interest arbitration system. The first
major variable is the amount of latitude given to arbitrators in the
contract writing process. In one form of interest arbitration, commonly
called conventional interest arbitration, the arbitrator has an almost
unlimited ability to write contract terms. 91 Each side presents offers and
the arbitrator can pick either offer or develop his or her own unique
solution.92 This form of interest arbitration is usually criticized for the
"chilling effect" it can have on the parties.93 The "chilling effect"
predicts that since each side is aware that the arbitrator can craft an
87. See id. at 20, 23.
88. See Arvid Anderson & Loren A. Krause, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to
the Strike, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 153 (1987); see also FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., How
ARBITRATION WORKS 131-41 (Martin M. Volz & Edward P. Gogin eds., Bureau of
National Affairs 1998).
89. See FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 131, 135, 137. For more on
grievance arbitration, see generally United Steelworkers of Am. v. Am. Mfg. Co., 363
U.S. 564 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S.
574 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Co., 363 U.S. 593
(1960). These cases comprise the "Steelworkers Trilogy" and guide grievance arbitration
in labor relations.
90. See, e.g., FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 134, 137.
91. See Elissa M. Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 383, 387 (1999); see also
HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 230.
92. See HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 230.
93. See J. Joseph Loewenberg, Interest Arbitration: Past, Present and Future, in
LABOR ARBITRATION UNDER FIRE 11, 117-18 (James L. Stem & Joyce M. Najita eds.,
1997); Meth, supra note 91, at 387.
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award, neither party has an incentive to bargain reasonably from the
start.94 Both sides are likely to stake out extreme positions and let the
arbitrator split the middle. 95
The competing version of interest arbitration is final-offer
arbitration (FOA).96 In FOA, the arbitrator is limited to choosing the
final offer presented by one of the parties.9 7 The goal of FOA is to
encourage good faith bargaining by motivating both sides to offer
reasonable positions.9 8 If one side stakes out an extreme position, it will
incur a significant risk that the arbitrator will adopt its adversary's
offer. 99 The possibility of losing entirely is the antidote to the poisonous
chilling effect. 00 In many situations, both parties want to avoid an actual
FOA hearing.101 At least one commentator has called an FOA hearing
"the hydrogen bomb poised above the bargaining table whose very terror
should assure its non-use."
1 02
B. The Number ofIssues Arbitrators Can Consider
In addition to the latitude afforded arbitrators, the number of issues
decided can also vary. In "issue by issue" arbitration, the arbitrator
makes a decision on each issue individually. 03  For example, the
arbitrator could select the union's position on health care, but the
company's position on wages and pensions. Issue by issue is more
consistent with conventional arbitration.10 4  The competing system is
total-package, in which the arbitrator must choose one party's entire
offer. 105 Combining total package and final offer maximizes the risk to
both parties. 06  In that situation, an arbitrator will award one. side
everything it wants while leaving the other side with nothing.
94. See Loewenberg, supra note 93, at 118.
95. See Meth, supra note 91, at 387.
96. See HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 230; Meth, supra note 91, at 384-
85.
97. See HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 230; Meth supra note 91, at 387-89.
98. See Meth, supra note 91, at 387.
99. See id. For example, in an interest arbitration dispute in Eugene, Oregon, the
interest arbitrator sided with the city government solely because the union insisted upon
an unreasonable manning requirement. See Gary Long & Peter Feuille, Final-Offer
Arbitration: Sudden Death in Eugene, 27 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 186, 193 (1974).
100. See Meth, supra note 91, at 387-88 (FOA acts as a "psychological, economic,
and political incentive for the parties to reach their own agreement.").
101. See Long & Feuille, supra note 99, at 202 ("[A] successful final-offer procedure
is one that is not used.").
102. Meth, supra note 91, at 388.
103. See id. at 394.
104. See id.
105. See Meth, supra note 91, at 394-95.
106. See id.
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C. Interest Arbitration in the Private Sector
Interest arbitration is rarely used in the private sector' 07 and has
traditionally been met with deep suspicion from labor academics, unions,
and management.10 8  R.W. Fleming, the former President of the
University of Michigan and a member of the National Academy of
Arbitrators, said that interest arbitration is historically considered
"unsound, unwise, and possibly un-American."' 09 On the union side,
George Meany, the long-time president of the AFL-CIO, lambasted
interest * arbitration in the private sector, claiming, "Compulsory
arbitration ... just will not work because it is an abrogation of
freedom." 0 Interest arbitration is usually eschewed in the private sector
since employees retain the right to strike,"' but it is widely used in the
public sector where the right to strike is restricted or limited.1 2 Today,
more than fifteen states have passed interest arbitration statues."' States
vary widely in the forms of arbitration used, be it conventional, final
offer, issue by issue, or total-package.1 14
107. See HARRY C. KATZ ET AL., supra note 58, at 229.
108. See R.W. Fleming, Interest Arbitration Revisited, 26 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 1
(1973), available at http://www.naarb.org/proceedings/pdfs/1973-1.pdf; Letter from R.
Theodore Clark, Senior Partner, Seyfarth Shaw, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy, Senator
Michael B. Enzi, Rep. George Miller & Rep. Howard P. McKeon (Feb. 13, 2009),
available at http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/090213efca.htm (including
historical quotes from labor union leaders opposed to interest arbitration in the private
sector and arguments from management on why interest arbitration is not necessary in the
private sector).
109. Fleming, supra note 108, at 1. While Fleming was describing this historic view,
his paper actually supported an expanded use of interest arbitration, though not through a
government mandate. See id. Fleming argued, "The essence of what I have to say today
is that it is time to rethink our position on interest arbitration, though I would prefer that
experimentation take place in a voluntary, nongovernmental context." Id.
110. Clark, supra note 108, at 10.
111. See Anderson & Krause, supra note 88, at 155 (describing interest arbitration as
the alternative to the strike and writing that "the success of collective bargaining requires
only one of these alternatives."); HARRY C. KATZ ET. AL., supra note 58, at 229 ("The
NLRA gives labor and management the right to strike over impasse and thereby avoids
the use of interest arbitration."); Loewenberg, supra note 93, at 111 (describing interest
arbitration as a "substitute" for strikes and lockouts). See generally Carl Stevens, Is
Compulsory Arbitration Compatible With Bargaining?, INDUS. REL., Feb. 1966, at 38.
112. See FRANK ELKOIURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 100-24; HARRY C. KATZ ET AL.,
supra note 58, at 230; see generally Robert G. Howlett, Interest Arbitration in the Public
Sector, 60 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 815 (1984).
113. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 51.
114. See FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 108-09.
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1. Major League Baseball
The only significant private sector industry that uses interest
arbitration regularly is major league baseball."' 5 Baseball players with
three to six years of experience are eligible to file for salary
arbitration." 6 The arbitrator must select either the player's or the club's
final salary offer." 7 The arbitrators are strictly limited in the criteria they
can use in formulating their decision." 8 The decision cannot be appealed
and the arbitrator's decision is binding for one year.' 19 Still, despite its
historic use, salary arbitration is highly limited in baseball. As Epstein
succinctly points out, baseball salary arbitration does not cover the
union's master agreement with club owners and only covers one issue:
salary.120  Even here, baseball has simplified the process because the
arbitrator can only select a single number-what the team or player
offers-and nothing else.12
2. The Steel and Tobacco Industries
The only other significant instances of interest arbitration in the
private sector can be found in the steel and tobacco industries.12 2 In the
1970s, the steel industry and labor unions agreed to an "Experimental
Negotiating Agreement" (ENA) calling for interest arbitration if contract
negotiations broke down.12 3 Labor and management reached agreements
in both 1974 and 1977 without using interest arbitration, possibly out of
fear of the interest arbitration procedure.12 4 Yet the ENA expired in the
1980s and industry and unions have not agreed to a similar provision.125
Years later, Philips Morris voluntarily agreed to interest arbitration with
115. See generally ROGER I. ABRAMS, THE MONEY PITCH: BASEBALL FREE AGENCY
AND SALARY ARBITRATION 142-66 (2000) (recounting first-hand experience as baseball
arbitrator); John Fizel, Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, DISP. RESOL. J., June 1994, at
42, 42-47.
116. See Fizel, supra note 115, at 43.
117. See ABRAMS, supra note 115, at 146-47. Fizel also notes that the arbitrators are
encouraged to make a decision within 24 hours and no written explanations are given.
See Fizel, supra note 115, at 43.
118. The only criteria that the arbitrator may consider are: player performance during
the past year, length and consistency of player's career, salaries of comparable players,
and the team's on-field success and attendance. See Fizel, supra note 115, at 43.
119. See ABRAMS, supra note 115, at 147.
120. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 65-66.
121. See ABRAMS, supra note 115, at 146-47.
122. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 329-30.
123. See id. at 330.
124. See id.
125. See id. Epstein claims that the "[ENA] system did not work, and it was
ultimately abandoned, only to be followed by the near-demise of the entire U.S. Steel
industry." See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 65.
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its unions.126 A 1989 journal article1 27 indicated that interest arbitration
was working as intended, but no studies of this arrangement have since
been published. Thus, our collective knowledge about interest
arbitration is based upon the public sector and sporadic, highly limited
experiments in the private sector.
V. WHY LABOR UNIONS SEEK INTEREST ARBITRATION
EFCA now seeks to inject interest arbitration into the private sector
in an unprecedented way. 12 8 The threshold question of any analysis of
EFCA's interest arbitration provision is why labor leaders, who
previously opposed interest arbitration as recently as only ten years
ago, 129 now favor it. Declining membership is part of the answer but
does not fully explain the embrace of interest arbitration by labor unions.
A. The Importance of the Election Year and Certification Year Bars
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to briefly review two
critical labor law "bars": the election-year barl 30 and the certification
year bar.' 3 1 Under the election-year bar, a new representation election
cannot be conducted in any bargaining unit for 12 months after an initial
election. 13 2 Likewise, under the certification bar, when a union wins an
initial election and is certified as the bargaining representative, no new
petitions can be filed for 12 months.133
Once the bars expire, employers can challenge the union's status as
the representative of the workers by either withdrawing majority status
entirely1 34 or filing a petition for a new election. 13 5  On their own,
employees can also challenge the union by filing a decertification
126. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 330.
127. Dennis Liberson, Labor Relations: Long-Term Agreements Work at Philip
Morris, PERSONNEL J., Dec. 1989, at 36, 36.
128. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 17 (stating that "Without question, this dramatic
switch in the current law enjoys no precedent in the private sector. . . .").
129. Kenneth B. Cooper, Interest Arbitration in the Airline Industry, Friend or Foe of
Collective Bargaining? in Industry Specific Arbitration Issues: The Airline Industry, 55
PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ARB. 132 (2002) (arguing against interest arbitration).
130. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3) (2006).
131. See Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96, 98 (1954).
132. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(3).
133. See Brooks, 348 U.S. at 98; see also 1 HIGGINS ET AL., supra note 1, at 556
("[T]he Board has required that in the absence of unusual circumstances, a certified
union's majority status must be honored for 1 year; and a petition filed during the 1-year
period will ordinarily be barred.").
134. See generally Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359
(1998). But see Levitz Furniture, 333 NLRB 717 (2001).
135. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(B).
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petition claiming that the union no longer represents the workers.' The
board will then conduct an election if it finds that a question of
representation exists and the petition is supported by a substantial
number of employees.13 7
As a result, labor unions are pressured to negotiate a first contract.
After the bars expire, their status as the majority representative can easily
be challenged.138 The likelihood of being challenged is even greater if
the union has not achieved a successful first contract negotiation. 139 For
example, the situation could easily arise where a union wins a
representation election by promising to improve wages, benefits, and
working conditions, but, during the first contract negotiation, the union
cannot actually secure improvements in the very aspects of work that it
promised to change. 140 At that juncture, employees might question the
wisdom of unionizing in the first place and express their dissatisfaction
to the employer. Employees could also take matters into their own hands
and file a decertification petition. In either scenario, the union will likely
lose this new bargaining unit.
B. The Decline of Labor's Ability to Convince Workers to Strike
In order to prevent this from happening, unions traditionally
pursued economic weapons against an employer to compel contract
terms, principally through the statutory right to strike.14 1  If contract
negotiations were proceeding poorly, the union could summon workers
136. See 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(1)(A)(ii); RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 208.
137. See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 208.
138. See William B. Gould, The Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, Labor Law
Reform, and What Can Be Done About the Broken System of Labor-Management
Relations in the United States, 43 U.S.F. L. REv. 291, 327 (2008) (Unions that fail to
successfully negotiate a contract "will have declining support within the bargaining
unit.").
139. Charles B. Craver, Rearranging Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Inadequacy of
Modest Proposals to Reform Labor Law, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1616, 1641 (1995) (If
employers "can avoid the execution of bargaining agreements during the certification
year, they can often defeat the newly certified union.").
140. See, e.g., The Employee Free Choice Act: Restoring Economic Opportunity for
Working Families S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 110th Cong.
14,15 (2007) (statement of Peter Hurtgen, Former NLRB Chair and FMCS Director)
("Newly certified unions often bear a heavy burden to make good on promises made to
employees to gain recognition. . . . [W]hen these promises come up against reality at the
bargaining table, it is often very difficult to reach agreement. . . .").
141. See 29 U.S.C. § 163 ("Nothing in this Act... shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike or to affect the
limitations or qualifications on that right."); see also RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 211
("The right to strike is statutorily protected and is considered a key element of a labor
relations system designed to encourage productive and peaceful collective bargaining.").
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to walk off the job, march the picket line, and hurt the company's
financial position.
Today, unions no longer consider the strike as a viable tool of
pressure. This reason is usually not included in the list of labor's
justifications for EFCA,14 2 because unions are reluctant to publicly admit
that they lack economic weapons to force employers to submit to their
demands. Still, this weakness is a contributing factor in the drive for
interest arbitration. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS),
unions engaged in only 15 strikes of employers with 1000 or more
workers in 2008.143 On average, unions have engaged in only 25 work
stoppages with employers of 1000 or more workers since 1995.144 Even
when labor can muster the support to strike, the actual number of days
that workers walk the picket lines is small. 14 5 Only one strike in 2008
with an employer of 1000 or more workers lasted more than 50 days and
nine of the 15 strikes were over in only ten days.146 This contrasts with
labor's historic success at striking. As late as 1974, unions engaged in
424 strikes of employers with 1000 or more workers. 14 7 At the height of
organized labor after World War II, the sheer number of workers that
labor could summon to strike was astounding.14 8 During the first six
months of 1946, strikes involved almost three million workers, and, by
the end of that year, as many as 4.6 million workers walked the picket
lines.14 9 In the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, major strikes erupted at well-known
companies and throughout industries, such as General Motors, U.S.
Steel, Kohler, Southern Telephone, General Electric, ports, railroads,
coal mines, and even the postal service.150
The watershed moment often cited as the beginning of the end of
labor's ability to strike was President Reagan's decision in 1981 to fire
approximately 11,000 striking air traffic controllers from the
Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO).'5' The
142. The author could not locate any news stories where labor advocated EFCA
passage based upon its inability to strike effectively.
143. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2008 (Feb.
11, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.nr0.htm..
144. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Major Work Stoppages in 2008, Table
1 (Feb. 11, 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkstp.t0l.htm.
145. See Press Release, supra note 143.
146. See id.
147. See Press Release Table 1, supra note 144.
148. See JAROL B. MANHEIM, THE DEATH OF A THOUSAND CUTS: CORPORATE
CAMPAIGNS AND THE ATrACK ON THE CORPORATION 34 (2001).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id. ("[lit was the use of this [strike] weapon in the public sector that brought
about the abrupt end of the second era of 20th-century labor relations."); see also William
Serrin, Reagan Stance on PATCO Causes Union Anxiety, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1981, at
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PATCO disaster was followed two years later by mining giant Phelps
Dodge locking out and replacing its striking workers.' 52
While unions cannot strike as effectively as before, it is important to
note that they still possess the right to strike. In her article arguing in
favor of interest arbitration, Fiske writes of the "unavailability of
strikes."' 53 This characterization is inaccurate. The right to strike is still
available to unions, but unions simply cannot use strikes effectively
because employees rationally prefer not to strike. The inability of unions
to convince workers to strike is the true problem facing labor unions.
Interest arbitration is a policy response to that problem-not the problem
of strikes being "unavailable."
Even with the ability to strike diminishing, unions initially did not
clamor for interest arbitration. For instance, in 2001, several Republican
senators, including Senators John McCain and Trent Lott, introduced
legislation that would mandate final-offer interest arbitration in the
airline industry. 154  The Airline Pilots Association, the major union
representing pilots, aggressively opposed the legislation, claiming:
We consider the McCain-Lott bill anathema to free collective
bargaining. The proposed McCain-Lott bill is repugnant to the
concept of collective bargaining. It undermines worker rights in the
most fundamental ways, by removing airline employees right to take
collective action in the form of a strike and vote on what will be their
union contract.... There is no legitimate public policy reason to
mandate arbitration.... .5
While the McCain-Lott legislation called for final-offer
arbitration, 15 6 a provision not currently in EFCA, the aggressive remarks
from the Airline Pilots Association representative can lead to the
A24 (quoting a Ford Foundation labor expert as saying, "When the unions come out of
the shock of what has happened, they are going to have to gird themselves for a very
different kind of effort."); William Serrin, A Union Chief Muses on Labor and the
Controllers, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1981, at A12 ("[I]f the Reagan administration succeeds
in decertifying the air traffic controllers union, it will be a watershed moment for the
nation's labor movement, not only for 18 million public employees, but also for
unionized workers in the private sector.").
152. See generally JONATHAN D. ROSENBLUM, COOPER CRUCIBLE (2nd. ed. 1998).
153. Fiske, supra note 9, at 60.
154. See Cooper, supra note 129, at 141-42. The bill was never reported out of
committee. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 341. It should also be noted that the airline
interest arbitration bill was the sole example that the author could find of legislatively
mandated interest arbitration in the private sector prior to EFCA.
155. Copper, supra note 129, at 143-44. Ironically, the same arguments advanced by
labor to oppose the McCain-Lott airline interest arbitration bill are now often used by
management and their advocates to oppose EFCA's interest arbitration provision. See
generally PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 18-28.
156. Cooper, supra note 129, at 144-45.
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inference that the union was probably opposed to any form of interest
arbitration.157  At least initially, even in the midst of a membership
decline and an inability to convince workers to strike, labor unions were
not in favor of interest arbitration and continued to rely on economic
pressure to achieve their goals.
C. The Rise of the Corporate Campaign
While much has been made of labor's weaknesses and the
disappearance of strikes, labor is not entirely helpless. Instead, unions
deserve credit for devising a new economic weapon-the corporate
campaign-which has terrified and devastated companies and partially
replaced the strike. 15 A corporate campaign is described as a:
long-term and wide-ranging program of economic, political, legal,
and psychological warfare, usually, but not exclusively, initiated by a
union or organized labor in general. It is directed against a
corporation that has opposed unionization, declined to accept contract
terms a union deems critical, or some other way refused to yield on
some issue of great importance to the organization launching the
campaign.159
During a corporate campaign, labor uses a variety of tactics to
tarnish a company's public image and force the company to acquiesce to
its demands, usually for union recognition or better contract terms. As
prominent labor leader Bruce Raynor put it, "We're not businessmen and
at the end of the day they are. If you're willing to cost them enough,
they'll give in." 6 0 The type of tactics that labor unions use in the course
of a corporate campaign include: introducing shareholder resolutions
designed to weaken the independence of management or directors;
encouraging ministers to give sermons critical of company or executives;
attacking the CEO by distributing literature to his or her neighbors;
alleging or implying sexual liaisons among executives; filing frivolous
unfair labor practice claims; recruiting celebrities or prominent
politicians to pressure management; establishing anti-company Web
157. See id. at 143-44.
158. See generally MANHEIM THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 148, at xiii; see also JAROL
MANHEIM, UNION TRENDS IN CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS 7 (2005); JAROL MANHEIM, POWER
FAILURE, POWER SURGE: UNION PENSION FUND ACTIVISM AND THE PUBLICLY HELD
CORPORATION 36-38 (2005); JAROL MANHEIM, LABOR PAINS: CORPORATE CAMPAIGNS IN
THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 1 (2003); RON KIPLING, THE NEW OTANI HOTEL & GARDEN:
A CORPORATE CAMPAIGN CASE STUDY 1 (1998).
159. MANHEIM THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 148, at xiii; see also MANHEIM UNION
TRENDS, supra note 158, at 7; MANHEIM POWER FAILURE, supra note 158, at 36-38;
MANHEIM LABOR PAINS, supra note 158, at 1; KIPLING, supra note 158, at 1.
160. MANHEIM UNION TRENDS, supra note 158, at 15.
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sites; commissioning, preparing, and distributing white papers attacking
the company; and challenging the zoning or permitting of any new
facilities sought by the company.16 1 This list is merely representative,
not exhaustive, and many other examples of creative union corporate
campaign techniques can be found. 16 2
The easiest way to understand a corporate campaign is to consider
the most well-known corporate campaign target: Wal-Mart. For most of
its existence, the retailer was not involved in hot-button labor or political
issues.163 Yet as the corporation, which is famously non-union, evolved
and moved into the grocery business in the midwest and northeast, its
business model threatened traditionally unionized grocery stores in those
areas.164 Unable to penetrate Wal-Mart through traditional organizing
methods, labor unions instead turned to the corporate campaign.165
Labor accused Wal-Mart of nearly every type of corporate misconduct
possible, pressured the company on Capitol Hill, and made life miserable
for Wal-Mart executives. 16 6  While the attacks might appear to be
unrelated, the reality is that nearly all of the anti-Wal-Mart fervor of the
last five years was driven by a systematic and organized campaign by
labor unions to force Wal-Mart into a more union-friendly posture.167
Wal-Mart is not alone. Dozens of other companies have faced labor's
wrath through this tool, including Comcast, Cintas, Albertson's,
American Airlines, AT&T, Bridgestone-Firestone, Beverly Enterprises,
Coca-Cola, Catholic Healthcare West, Food Lion, Hilton Hotels, K-Mart,
Marriot, MGM Grand, New Otani Hotel, Smithfield Foods, Nike, and
ups.168
161. Id. at 16-17. Another example of a corporate campaign tactic was sending
postcards to maternity patients of a healthcare system warning that their babies may be
born on soiled or bloody linens because of a threatened laundry strike. The healthcare
system successfully sued the union for libel damages and was awarded seventeen million
dollars in a jury trial. See Sutter Health v. Unite Here, No. S-cv-17938, 2006 WL
2571305, at *1 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 21, 2006).
162. See generally MANHEIM UNION TRENDS, supra note 158, at 16-17; MANHEIM
LABOR PAINS, supra note 158, at 23-29; KIPLING, supra note 158, at 18-32.
163. See generally RICHARD VEDDER & WENDELL COX, THE WAL-MART REVOLUTION
44-66 (2006) (detailing history of Wal-Mart during which the retailer was not involved in
any significant public policy controversies).
164. See Ryan Ellis, Unions Use Smear Tactics in Corporate Campaigns,
HUMANEVENTS.COM, Apr. 23, 2007, http://www.humanevents.com/article.phpid=20366
(last visited Jan. 25, 2010).
165. See id.
166. See id.; see also Steven Greenhouse, Opponents of Wal-Mart to Coordinate
Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2005, § 1, at 20.
167. See generally Ellis, supra note 164.
168. See MANHEIM THOUSAND CUTS, supra note 148, at 341-46; MANHEIM POWER
SURGE, supra note 158, at 28-29.
230 [Vol. 115:1
EFCA's INTEREST ARBITRATION PROVISION
While the corporate campaign has served as a strike substitute and
the principal economic weapon of labor in the last 20 years, two
problems have arisen with its use. First and foremost, success can vary.
For example, unions claimed major victories when janitorial companies
agreed to card check organizing in Miami1 69 and Houston170 after
corporate campaigns by the Service Employees International Union.
However, other corporate campaign targets have resisted and
successfully weathered the union storm.17' The second problem is that
corporate campaigns are time-consuming and expensive.172 A successful
corporate campaign takes months, and possibly even years, of planning
by union organizers and requires a significant financial investment.173
Unions hope that the investment will lead to a pay-off in the end through
new dues-paying members or more advantageous contracts, but there are
no guarantees. Thus, labor unions need a new way to advance their
contract and organizing goals. In turn, while previously rebuffing
interest arbitration,174 labor unions have now embraced it as an effective
remedy.'75  In pressing for interest arbitration in first contracts, unions
essentially are asking for the government to do for them what they are
unable to do for themselves-force companies into accepting their
contract demands.
VI. THE THREE FLAWS OF LABOR'S SOLUTION
Three major problems, however, arise with this solution. First, the
courts traditionally have favored economic weapons, not government
169. See Steven Greenhouse, Walkout Ends at University of Miami as Janitors' Pact
Is Reached, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2006, at A15.
170. See Steven Greenhouse, Cleaning Companies in Accord With Striking Janitors,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2006, at A18.
171. While Wal-Mart has adopted a more conciliatory tone towards its critics, the
company is still union-free. See Kris Maher, Union Intensifies Efforts to Organize
Workers at Wal-Mart, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2009, at A4; see also Michael Barbaro, Wal-
Mart's Detractors Come In From The Cold, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at Cl ("But after
waging an aggressive public relations campaign against Wal-Mart for three years, the
company's full-time, union-backed critics, who once vowed never to give up, are putting
down their cudgels."); Stephanie Rosenbloom & Michael Barbaro, Smiles All Around at
Wal-Mart's Annual Meeting, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2008, at C2 ("The chain has won over
many long-term critics with a series of prominent reforms."). Another company that has
successfully fought a corporate campaign is Cintas, a mostly non-union industrial laundry
company based in Cincinnati. See HURTGEN & COHEN, MAKING YOUR VOTE COUNT,
supra note 62, at 58.
172. See MANHEIM UNION TRENDS, supra note 158, at 15, 36.
173. See id.
174. See Cooper, supra note 129, at 141-42; Clark, supra note 108, at 10.
175. Steven Greenhouse, Union Head Would Back Bill Without Card Check, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 2009, at B3.
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intervention, in American collective bargaining.' 76 Second, EFCA would
fundamentally alter the relatively level playing field of U.S. labor
relations in organized labor's favor.177  Finally, before implementing
such a radical change, unions should first pursue internal reforms. 7 8 I
will review each of these weaknesses in greater detail.
A. Interest Arbitration Is Incompatible with American Collective
Bargaining
Requiring interest arbitration is a drastic remedy. 7 9 Since the
passage of the National Labor Relations Act, courts have encouraged
unions and corporations to use economic weapons in furtherance of their
goals. 80  In National Labor Relations Board v. Insurance Agents
International Union, the Supreme Court unequivocally defended the use
of economic weapons in a labor dispute.'8 ' In siding with the
employees' right to engage in economic warfare against the company,
the Court held that "the use of economic pressure . . . is . . . not at all
inconsistent with the duty of bargaining in good faith."'82 The Court
further wrote:
The presence of economic weapons in reserve and their actual
exercise on occasion by the parties, is part and parcel of the system
that the Wagner and Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized....
[T]he use of economic pressure by the parties to a labor dispute is not
a grudging exception to some golicy of completely academic
discussion enjoined by the Act....
The courts have endorsed economic weapons for both labor and
management by approving defensive' 84 and offensive lockouts' for
176. See infra pp. 44-49.
177. See infra pp. 50-56.
178. See infra pp. 57-61.
179. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 17.
180. See NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965) (endorsing defensive lockouts); Am.
Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1960) (endorsing offensive lockouts); NLRB v.
Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960) (generally protecting the right to use
economic pressure); Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956) (holding that
union does not have to give normal time and notice requirements for unfair labor practice
strike); NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938) (endorsing
management's right to hire replacement workers during strike); 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2006)
(protecting the right to strike).
181. See Ins. Agents Int'l Union, 361 U.S. at 489-91, 494-95, 497-98.
182. Id.at490-91.
183. Id. at 489, 495.
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employers, the right of employers to hire replacement workers,1 86 and,
more recently, judicial endorsement of extremely aggressive corporate
campaign techniques by unions.187 Furthermore, so-called "Machinists"
preemption in labor law is premised on the notion that certain economic
weapons by both labor and management are neither protected nor
prohibited by the NLRA and thus are preempted from state regulation.188
States are unable to regulate in these areas and unions and employers
must "draw on the strength of their bargaining skills and economic
weapons without interference from government."' 89 In this way, the
concept of interest arbitration is inconsistent with our traditionally
American notion of collective bargaining.
In her article broadly defending EFCA's interest arbitration
provision, Fiske downplays the concern that EFCA's interest arbitration
provision would be a radical change.' 90  She claims that interest
arbitration is a "time-tested process."l91 She then argues that arbitration
is commonplace in society, since "arbitrators in fact decide a huge
number of the most financially and socially significant issues across the
whole spectrum of private sector employment." 92 She cites arbitrators
being used in situations such as employment discrimination cases, screen
credit fights in Hollywood, and disputes in professional sports.19 3
However, these general arbitration examples are misleading because
they are simply not instances of government mandated interest
arbitration. In the examples that Fiske cites, both sides voluntarily agree
to arbitration, either as part of the contract or as a way to resolve a
184. See Brown, 380 U.S. at 280; see also Quaker State Oil Refining Co., 121 NLRB
334 (1958); NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449 (Buffalo Linens), 353 U.S. 87
(1957).
185. See American Ship Building Co., 380 U.S. at 310-11.
186. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 347 (1938)
187. See Cintas Corp. v. UNITE HERE, 601 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576-80 (S.D.N.Y.
2009).
188. See Int'l Ass'n Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wis. Employment Relations
Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
189. See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 312. This preference probably finds broader
grounding in our capitalist economic system, which generally encourages the private
sector and disfavors excessive governmental intervention into business affairs. To be
sure, capitalism is not absolute, and since the New Deal era, laws that restrict capitalism
have been found to be constitutional so long as they affect interstate commerce and are
rationally related to a government interest. See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. U.S.,
379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); but see U.S. v. Lopez,
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
190. Fiske, supra note 9, at 50-53.
191. Id. at 50.
192. Id. at 52.
193. Id. at 53.
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contract dispute.194  These examples of voluntary arbitration are
consistent with the traditional way that arbitration is handled in the labor-
management context, with the leading treatise on arbitration finding that
"arbitration has been and still is a product of private contract between
labor and management."1 95 The lack of compulsory interest arbitration
can also be evidenced when, on page two of this 1233 page volume, the
authors make clear that while "submissions of disputes may be made
compulsory by law ... the use of the term arbitration in this book refers
to voluntary arbitration."l 96  Fiske's examples are fundamentally
different from EFCA's interest arbitration provision because Congress
has not dictated that Hollywood must use arbitration to resolve screen
credit battles, nor has Congress legislated that employers and employees
must first use arbitration before pursuing litigation. Just because some
parties have voluntarily found arbitration to be a more convenient forum
for conflict resolution and have freely decided to use that forum does not
necessarily mean that Congress should mandate its use. Business
executives frequently report that some of their biggest deals were made
on the golf course.' 97 This does not mean that Congress should require
every business executive to play golf. Fiske's article also ignores the
legislative history of the NLRA, which clearly supports the view that
Congress did not believe that the government was empowered to compel
a single contract term.198
Furthermore, her assertion that interest arbitration is "time-tested"
depends upon the definition of time. As she later admits, "interest
arbitration is not common in the American private sector."' 99 As
reviewed earlier, interest arbitration's use is almost entirely confined to
the public sector and even then we have only a track record of about
forty years200-which might or might not make it "time-tested."
Clearly, the point remains that congressionally-mandated interest
arbitration as promulgated by EFCA is a revolutionary change in labor
law.
194. See FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 317 ("Arbitration may be initiated
either (1) by a submission, or (2) by a demand or notice invoking a collective agreement
arbitration clause.").
195. FRANK ELKOURI ETAL.,supra note 88, at 28 (emphasis added).
196. FRANK ELKOURI ET AL., supra note 88, at 2.
197. See Veronica Byrd, Study ofExecutives and Links; In Golfand Business, Similar
Strokes Seen, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1993, at D5 (reporting that in a new survey more than
one-third of business executives said that their biggest deals were made on the golf
course).
198. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103-05 (1970) (citing 79 Cong. Rec.
S. 7659 (1935)) ("Let me say that the bill requires no employer to sign any contract, to
make any agreement, to reach any understanding. . .)
199. Fiske, supra note 9, at 50.
200. See Howlett, supra note 112, at 815-20.
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B. Interest Arbitration Would Fundamentally Alter the Union-
Management Landscape in Labor's Favor
In addition to being a dramatic change, interest arbitration would
swing the contract pendulum toward unions in a way not envisioned by
original labor legislation.2 01 If interest arbitration becomes law, unions
will have few incentives to negotiate with employers.20 2 Instead, labor
would have every incentive to let the 130 days run and then turn
everything over to the arbitration panel. It would be highly unlikely that
the arbitrator would award them anything less than what they would get
in a traditional negotiation, especially if the traditional negotiation does
not even produce a contract. A strong possibility exists that the arbitrator
could award them fantastic contract terms.203 For example, an arbitrator
recently imposed a 33 percent wage increase for workers at a Wal-Mart
tire shop in a binding arbitration proceeding in Canada.204 The danger of
interest arbitration tilting the playing field in this manner was
persuasively made by former NLRB Chairman, and usual union ally,
William Gould. In a law review article on EFCA, Gould wrote that
EFCA:
[A]s presently written, will entice unions to seek arbitration
awards which resemble or replicate the best collective
bargaining agreements or master agreements which they have
previously negotiated. This will mean that there is less
incentive for the union to bargain and that the tables will be
quickly turned as the potential for union obduracy supplants that
of the employer.205
Fiske takes issue with the argument that interest arbitration will
automatically favor unions or discriminate against employers.20 6 While
conceding that "arbitration would strengthen nascent unions in the first
contract scenario,"20 7 she then argues that fears about arbitrators are
"entirely speculative" and that "there is no factual basis for believing that
arbitrators chosen to resolve bargaining disputes will not understand the
company's business."2 08 Her charge, however, is ironic given that her
own arguments suffer from the same fallacy. Every argument about
201. See PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 22-23.
202. See Gould, supra note 138, at 328.
203. See Miles Moore, Wal-Mart Canada Closes Unionized Tire/Lube Outfit, TIRE
Bus., Oct. 27, 2008, at 4.
204. See id.
205. Gould, supra note 138, at 328.
206. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 75-76.
207. Id. at 64.
208. Id. at 75.
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interest arbitration in the private sector is speculative because the system
mandated by EFCA has never been widely attempted. Nobody truly
knows how it will work. Although, given everything we know about
interest arbitration, it does not seem outlandish that employers fear the
consequences of unelected government bureaucrats coming into their
businesses and writing labor contracts for their newly unionized
businesses.
Fiske then attacks scholars like Epstein and employer organizations
like the U.S. Chamber of Commerce for stoking the fear that arbitrators
will favor unions, claiming that both Epstein and the Chamber of
Commerce are hostile "to collective bargaining more generally." 20 9
Creating this straw man conveniently ignores the fact that Gould-whom
she favorably cites throughout her paper and clearly does not have an
anti-union bent-has flatly stated that EFCA's interest arbitration
provision will give unions a strong incentive for obdurate behavior.2 10
Additionally, the evidence that Fiske cites of arbitration working
fairly and not favoring unions211 relies on the public sector interest
arbitration experience. No evidence exists that the unique circumstances
of the public sector will automatically transfer to the private sector. The
limited experience with Canadian arbitrators and Wal-Mart was not
encouraging for either the company or the workers involved as the
arbitrator's extreme award led to the closure of the tire shop.2 12
At least one prominent voice with significant experience in both
public sector interest arbitration and private sector contract negotiations,
Peter Hurtgen, does not share Fiske's optimism. Hurtgen, who was
appointed by President Clinton to the NLRB, served as its chair and
eventually as Director of FMCS as well, has negotiated hundreds of
contracts in both sectors.1 He criticized the suggestion that simply
because interest arbitration has functioned in the public sector, it will
produce negotiated agreements in the private sector.2 14 Hurtgen told the
Senate Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions that in his
public sector arbitration negotiations, "More often than not, the parties
bargained simply to set the issue for the arbitrator . .. the process led to
215
hearing[s,] . . . not agreements.
Beyond this point, Fiske then argues that the current state of labor
relations, and especially first contract negotiations, is not a balanced
209. Id. at 81.
210. Gould, supra note 138, at 328.
211. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 65-74.
212. See Moore, supra note 203, at 4.
213. See Hurtgen, supra note 140, at 15-16.
214. See id.
215. Id. at 16.
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playing field anyway. Fiske claims that the NLRB does not effectively
remedy bad-faith bargaining violations by employers because of
"crabbed"2 1' interpretations from "conservative courts and boards."2 17
This ad-hominem allegation is unfounded when one considers that
Democratic presidents have controlled appointments to the NLRB for
more than half of its existence,218 and the Supreme Court case219 that
reaffirmed the notion that the government cannot set private contract
terms was decided in 1970-hardly the conservative apex of the Court.
While Fiske is right that scholars frequently criticize these decisions,2 20 it
is equally possible that labor scholars are not interpreting the law
correctly. The NLRB and courts (all experts in the law themselves), for
70 years now, and across Republican and Democratic appointments,
have favored a competing interpretation.
Moving past this ad-hominem attack and considering the substance
of Fiske's charge-that the Board does not use its full remedial power to
deter bad-faith negotiations-the union retains the right to file an unfair
221
labor practice charge against an employer for bad-faith negotiations.
A successful charge will usually result in a board order to negotiate in
good-faith.222 This is admittedly not the most aggressive remedy
possible, but labor remedies are unique because of the circumstances of
labor relations. As discussed earlier, the union retains a wide array of
economic weapons at its disposal, including the right to strike.223  A
similar right to engage in economic warfare is usually not found in other
legal settings. The core of her argument essentially becomes that the law
should be tilted in labor's favor because unions cannot convince workers
to strike. Again, this is not the traditional interpretation of the NLRA
from either the Board or courts, which favors economic weapons and has
tried to fashion a fair playing field without the state "putting its thumb on
the scale."224
Finally, Fiske repeats the claim that employers have an unfair
advantage because they can unilaterally implement their final proposals
216. Fiske, supra note 9, at 59.
217. Id. at 57.
218. The author calculates that Democratic Presidents have controlled appointments
to the NLRB for thirty-nine years while Republican Presidents have controlled NLRB
appointments for only thirty-six years. For a listing of presidential administrations since
the passage of the NLRA in 1935, see About the White House: The Presidents,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
219. H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99 (1970).
220. See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 9, at 59.
221. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
222. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 56.
223. See 29 U.S.C. § 163.
224. See RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 312.
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after impasse is reached.22 5 This argument apparently insinuates that
management can implement whatever it desires. In reality, management
can only implement a proposal that it has already offered to the union in
226the negotiating process. It is possible for these proposals to contain
better terms and conditions than the employees previously enjoyed
because "unrealistically harsh or extreme proposals can serve as
evidence that the party offering them lacks a serious intent to adjust
differences," 227 easily leading to a bad-faith bargaining charge. 22 8 For
example, the Board found a proposal implemented at impasse that gave
management complete discretion over wage increases without any
participation by the union was "so inherently destructive of the
fundamental principles of collective bargaining that it could not be
sustained." 2 2 9 Thus, while labor unions might not be pleased with an
implemented proposal, such a proposal could actually represent an
improvement in the working conditions of employees. At a minimum,
such proposals will not vest "exclusive control in the employer" 23 0
because such behavior can form the basis of a bad-faith bargaining
charge.23 1
Furthermore, even if employer proposals are unfair, interest
arbitration would be a drastic solution to this problem. More modest
remedies are appropriate. For example, Congress could require that the
same terms and conditions of employment that previously governed the
workplace before unionization are implemented at impasse. This would
ensure that neither labor nor management would gain an unfair
advantage as the parties continue to negotiate. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit suggested this solution in
a 1997 case, pointing out that "The Board could have adopted, for
example, a rule requiring the status quo to remain in effect until either
the union or the employer was willing to resume negotiations. Stagnancy
might pressure both the union and employer to bend."232
Moreover, if Fiske is correct in her suggestion that the ability to
implement is a major employer advantage, she nonetheless fails to
mention the many advantages labor unions enjoy throughout the entire
organizing process. In addition to the right to strike and not be fired for
doing so, 23 3 both Hurtgen and Charles Cohen, another Clinton appointee
225. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 55-59.
226. See Dannin, supra note 55, at 25-27.
227. Liquor Industry Bargaining Group, 333 NLRB 1219, 1220 (2001).
228. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
229. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 321 NLRB 1386, 1391 (1996).
230. Liquor Industry, 333 NLRB at 1220.
231. 29 U.S.C. § 158.
232. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
233. 29 U.S.C. § 163; RAY ET AL., supra note 15, at 217.
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to the NLRB, cite several other key union advantages including: the
ability to control whether and when a union election petition is filed; the
ability to define precisely what workers will be included in the possible
bargaining unit; the ability to visit workers at home to convince them to
vote for the union; and the ability to make almost unfettered promises to
workers to persuade them to unionize.234
Overall, since the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the NLRB and the
courts have tried to create a balanced playing field in labor relations.235
Both management and unions have advantages and disadvantages in the
236
process. Despite Fiske's arguments to the contrary, interest arbitration
would decidedly change this playing field in labor's favor. It makes little
sense to remove this balance and shift first contract negotiations in this
manner. 23 7
C. The Need for Internal Union Reform
What is striking about labor is that despite seeing its market share
decline, unions still largely function the same way they did 50 years
ago.238 Andy Stem, former President of the Service Employee
International Union and often considered the intellectual leader of
today's labor movement, has best captured this sentiment, arguing, "Our
movement is going out of existence, and yet too many labor leaders go
and shake their heads and say they'll do something, and then they go
back and do the same thing the next day."239
A full critique of the internal reforms unions could pursue to reverse
their membership decline is well beyond the scope of this Comment.
Still, it should be noted that labor continues to concentrate a large
amount of its manpower and finances on the political process.240 Eight
of the top ten Political Action Committee donors to the Democratic Party
were labor unions in the 2007-2008 election cycle.2 4 1 Yet, according to
234. See Hurtgen, supra note 140, at 10; Cohen, supra note 84, at 12 ("Far from being
unfair to unions, the NLRB's election process offers unions many unique advantages.").
235. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 157 ("Employees shall have the right self-organization ...
and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities. .); RAY ET
AL., supra note 15, at 312.
236. See Hurtgen, supra note 140, at 10; Cohen, supra note 84, at 12.
237. See PIERCING THE RHETORIC, supra note 78, at 22-23 ("Imposing mandatory
interest arbitration on private sector employers would skew the once-leveled playing field
of collective bargaining in the union's favor.").
238. See Matt Bai, The New Boss, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2005, § 6, at 38.
239. Id.
240. See MANHEIM POWER SURGE, supra note 158, at 23-29.
241. See Center for Responsive Politics, Top 20 PAC Contributors to Democratic
Candidates 2007-2008, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/toppacs.php?Type=C&cycle=
2008&Pty=D (last visited Nov. 16, 2009). Labor's total contributions to Democrats
totaled over sixty million dollars with ninety-two percent of their overall contributions
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non-partisan exit polls, 39 percent of union households voted for the
Republican Presidential candidate, John McCain.242 Since 1976,
approximately 38 percent of union households have voted for the
Republican candidate in any given year.243 Furthermore, public opinion
research suggests that large majorities believe that unions are too
politically active.244 The Harris Poll asked this question in 1993 and
2005 and found that 70 and 67 percent of respondents respectively
agreed that unions are too involved in political activities. 45 While it is
probably impossible-and unwise-for labor to retreat from politics
entirely, in its quest for new relevance and a broader appeal to non-union
workers, labor's heavy involvement in politics might be exacerbating its
larger problems.
Recent public opinion polls also show a broad public dissatisfaction
with labor unions that could be hurting their recruitment efforts. A 2009
Gallup poll found that unions are largely unpopular with the American
public with only 48 percent of the country approving of labor unions and
42 percent, a plurality of respondents, hoping that unions have less
influence in the future.246 Even union members themselves are not
especially pleased with the labor movement, with 61 percent of union
households rating labor negatively in the Harris survey.247
While labor unions and their allies in academia blame the National
Labor Relations Board,248 Republican politicians,24 9 companies like Wal-
Mart,2 50 anti-union consultants and lawyers, 2 5 1 the courts, 252 and nearly
every other major or minor player in labor relations for their membership
landing in Democratic coffers. See Center for Responsive Politics, Labor PAC
Contributions to Federal Candidates, 2008, http://www.opensecrets.org/pacs/sector.php?
cycle=2008&txt-P01 (last visited Jan. 31, 2010).
242. See CNN 2008 National Exit Polls, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/
results/polls/#val=USP00p3 (last visited Nov. 15, 2009).
243. See New York Times Exit Polls 1976-2004, http://graphics7.nytimes.com/
images/2004/l1/06/weekinreview/nwrELECTORATE 041107.gif (last visited Nov. 15,
2009).
244. HARRIS POLL, NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TO LABOR UNIONS SHOw LITTLE CHANGE IN
PAST DECADE (2005), available at http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris-poll/
index.asp?PID=598.
245. Id.
246. GALLUP POLL, LABOR UNIONS SEE SHARP SLIDE IN U.S. PUBLIC SUPPORT (2009),
available at http://www.gallup.com/poll/12744/labor-unions-sharp-slide-public-
support.aspx.
247. See HARRIS POLL, supra note 244.
248. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, Critics Say Labor Board Favors Business, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A33.
249. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 4, at A33.
250. See, e.g., Greenhouse, supra note 166, § 1, at 20.
251. See, e.g., Steven Greenhouse, How Do You Drive Out a Union? South Carolina
Factory Provides a Textbook Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14. 2004, at A30.
252. See, e.g., Fiske, supra note 9, at 59.
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woes, with the notable exception of Stern, 25 3 unions never seem to blame
themselves for any of their problems. In fairness, unions should
probably take responsibility as well for failing to adapt their strategies to
today's workforce and for pursuing political agendas that likely offend
would-be union members. Before drastic government intervention,
unions instead should first be expected to undertake some internal
reforms. It might be that a new vision of labor unions that addresses
these problems-a vision which is currently unimagined by today's labor
leaders254 -could both co-exist with the historic NLRA framework and
boost labor union membership at the same time.
VII. INTEREST ARBITRATION: FUTURE PROSPECTS AND PRACTICAL
CONCERNS
A. Labor's Unwavering Support
While interest arbitration is problematic, organized labor is steadfast
in its support.255 Even with labor's strong backing, the prospect of any
part of EFCA being enacted, including interest arbitration, is unclear.
The bill was introduced in both the House and Senate in 2009,256 but the
legislation stalled during the health care debate and neither chamber
formally passed the bill. 2 57 Labor leaders were optimistic that the bill
would be passed in 2010,258 but moderate and conservative Democrats
259
were reluctant to support the legislation in a midterm election year.
The interest arbitration part of the bill seems to be the provision that
labor leaders crave the most. 2 60 Labor has shown some willingness to
253. See Bai, supra note 238, § 6, at 38.
254. While Stem has often positioned himself as this new leader, many of his policies
seem to echo the same positions that have failed labor for fifty years. See Matthew
Kiminski, The Weekend Interview: Andy Stern, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 2008, at A9.
255. See Greenhouse, supra note 175, at B3.
256. See Sean Higgins, Card Check Bill Support Down From Last Time, INVESTORS
Bus. DAILY, Mar. 11, 2009, at AO1.
257. For current status, see http://thomas.loc.gov (type "Employee Free Choice Act"
into "Search Bill Summary and Status" box; then click on H.R. 1409 and S. 560; last
major action for both bills was report to appropriate subcommittees). See also Jeanne
Cummings, For Labor, There's Always Next Year, POLITICO, Dec. 15, 2009, available at
http://www.politico.com/stories/1209/30598.html.
258. Mark Schoeff, Labor Leader Predicts Free Choice Act Passage by April,
WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT, Jan. 11, 2010, available at http://www.workforce.com/
section/00/article/26/92/38.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2010).
259. See Cummings, supra note 257 ("Backers of [EFCA] are hoping it will re-
emerge.... But ... it's unclear whether Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) has been able to
hash out language acceptable to the moderates and conservatives . . . a task made all the
more difficult by the looming midterm elections.").
260. See Greenhouse, supra note 175, at B3.
2010] 241
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
compromise on the card check provision, 26 1 but has held firm in its
insistence for interest arbitration.262
Even though the bill failed to pass in 2010, it is likely that labor will
not abandon interest arbitration. In fact, labor has proven resilient with
EFCA up until this point. The bill was first introduced in 2003,263 at a
time when Republicans controlled both the House and Senate after the
2002 midterm elections and a conservative policy direction was
assured. 26 4 The bill was reintroduced in 2005,265 after Republicans were
re-elected to majorities in Congress and President Bush was re-elected to
the White House.266 If labor was willing to introduce the bill and fight
for the bill under those less than ideal circumstances,26 7 then a strong
possibility exists that labor will continue to press for the bill's passage in
the future, perhaps when the political climate has changed again. Even if
the entire bill is never passed, the interest arbitration portion could be
separated from the main bill and presented as a stand-alone piece of
26826legislation or enacted through the NLRB rule-making procedure.269
261. See id.
262. Id.
263. See http://thomas.loc.gov (follow "Committee Reports" link; follow "110th
Congress link"; then type "Employee Free Choice Act"; click on "House Report 110-
023"; go to section on "108th Congress").
264. See, e.g., Alison Mitchell, The 2002 Elections: The Overview; Victorious
Republicans Preparing A Drive for Bush Agenda and Judgeship Nominees, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 7, 2002, at Al ("Republicans began setting plans yesterday to push forward a
domestic agenda ... as they savored a sweep of the midterm elections that gave them
complete control of the Capitol.").
265. See http://thomas.loc.gov (follow "Committee Reports" link; follow "110th
Congress link"; then type "Employee Free Choice Act"; click on "House Report 110-
023"; go to section on "109th Congress").
266. See, e.g., David Kirkpatrick, The 2004 Elections: Issues-Conservatives; Some
Backers of Bush Say They Anticipate a 'Revolution', N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2007, at P1
("Exulting in their electoral victories, President Bush's conservative supporters
immediately turned to staking out mandates for an ambitious agenda of long-cherished
goals. . . .").
267. See David Weigel, Union Rules, REASON, June 2008, available at
http://reason.com/archives/2008/05/07/union-rules (quoting AFL-CIO organizing director
Stewart Acuff as stating that "When we started working on this legislation five years
ago .. . people in Washington said it would never be taken seriously, never pass the laugh
test.").
268. This specific scenario seems like a strong possibility. From a public relations
perspective, card check was always a hard sell given that it would take away the right of
workers to vote via secret ballot, an easily understood and essentially American concept.
On the other hand, interest arbitration is difficult for the average citizen to understand and
does not inspire the same sort of nostalgia that a secret ballot does.
269. The NLRB has traditionally eschewed the same rule-making that other
administrative agencies have embraced. See Mark H. Greenwald, The NLRB's First
Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DuKE L. J. 274 (1991). But in November
2009, the National Mediation Board (NMB)-a separate administrative agency that
governs airline and railway labor disputes-announced a significant rule-making change
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While business groups might be relieved that EFCA and interest
arbitration were not passed in 2009, interest arbitration is far from dead.
If the legislation is advanced either in Congress or through the rule-
making process, then the focus will turn from the pros and cons of
interest arbitration generally to how a specific interest arbitration system
should work.
B. EFCA Lacks Details on How Arbitration Would Operate
Unfortunately, the current text of EFCA gives little guidance on
how interest arbitration would actually operate.
1. FMCS Is Not Familiar with Interest Arbitration
The bill entrusts complete discretion to the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service (FMCS) to formulate regulations. 2 70 This structure
stands in stark contrast to the other areas where interest arbitration is
used such as Major League Baseball, where specific rules mandate how
arbitrators are selected, criteria that should be used, and the type of
arbitration system that will be employed. 2 7 1 EFCA's interest arbitration
provision contains none of these directives. 272 For this reason alone, at
least two noteworthy labor lawyers have questioned whether interest
arbitration could pass constitutional scrutiny under the non-delegation
273doctrine.
The reliance on FMCS is even more peculiar when one considers
that FMCS has little experience in interest arbitration.274 FMCS
that would allow for easier union organizing. See Proposal Aims to Ease Unionizing at
Airlines and Railroads, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2009, at B9. While the NLRB and NMB are
completely separate agencies, speculation abounds that the NLRB might follow the
NMB's lead and engage in rule-making that could allow for easier union organizing or
other union-friendly positions-such as interest arbitration. The NLRB is currently
controlled by Democratic board members. See NLRB Board Members,
http://www.nlrb.gov/abous-us/overview/board/index.aspx.
270. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409 § 3, 11Ith Cong. (2009);
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560 § 3, 111th Cong. (2009).
271. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 115, at 142-66.
272. See Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, H.R. 1409 § 3, 111th Cong. (2009);
Employee Free Choice Act of 2009, S. 560 § 3, 111th Cong. (2009).
273. See Philip B. Rosen & Richard I. Greenberg, Constitutional Viability of the
Employee Free Choice Act's Interest Arbitration Provision, 26 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP.
L.J. 33, 59-60 (2008). But see Fiske, supra note 9, at 82-93. .
274. See FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ARBITRATION STATISTICS
2008 (2008), available at http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/itemDetail.asp?categorylD=
196&itemlD=21837.
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primarily serves as a voluntary mediator in labor disputes.275 FMCS
statistics prove this point.276 In fiscal year 2008, FMCS was involved in
a mere 21 mediations of new or reopened contract terms.277 During that
same time period, FMCS mediated 2046 contract interpretations or
applications.278
Fiske claims that FMCS is well-suited for this interest arbitration
role and that "the FMCS reports that it is actively involved in attempting
to mediate first contract bargaining relationships." 27 9 Her sole citation
for this assertion is Gould's law review article. 28 0  However, Gould
provides no supporting reference for this claim. 281 This argument, then,
is nothing more than an unsupported assertion. The more persuasive
evidence is the official FMCS data, which clearly demonstrate that
FMCS has little prior interest arbitration experience.282
Because of the lack of direction from the legislation itself, and
FMCS's unfamiliarity with interest arbitration, significant policy voids
will exist if interest arbitration is enacted. The most complete idea of
how to fill these gaps has come from David Broderdorf, a management
attorney at Morgan Lewis & Bockius.283 Broderdorf specifically urges
three components to an interest arbitration system: first, he argues for a
conventional arbitration system in lieu of final-offer arbitration; next, he
would mandate specific criteria to be used by interest arbitrators in
guiding their decisions; finally, he states that interest arbitration should
only be used for situations involving bad-faith bargaining by the
parties.284 Overall, Broderdorf makes a thought-provoking and well-
reasoned argument for his vision of interest arbitration. Fiske's article
responds to several of Broderdorfs points. I will review each of his
three components and Fiske's criticisms when applicable.
275. See Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, Frequently Asked Questions
About FMCS, http://www.fmcs.gov/intemet/faq.asp?categorylD=22 (last visited Nov.
16, 2009) ("Collective bargaining mediation is a voluntary process ..... ").
276. FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION ARBITRATION STATISTICS, supra note
274.
277. Id.
278. Id. 2008 was fairly typical of FMCS data historically on this issue. In looking at
the 2006 statistics, Broderdorf found that out of 2473 topics mediated by FMCS, only 16
involved new or reopened contract terms. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 329. He
concluded, "As one can see from the 2006 numbers, interest arbitration makes up a very
small percentage of the total use of FMCS arbitration services." Id.
279. Fiske, supra note 9, at 52.
280. See id.
281. See Gould, supra note 138, at 326.
282. See FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION ARBITRATION STATISTICS, supra
note 274.
283. Broderdorf, supra note 9, at n.al.
284. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 325, 345.
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C. EFCA's Logistical Concerns
1. Conventional or FOA Arbitration
Broderdorf argues in favor of conventional arbitration and against
final-offer arbitration, on the grounds that arbitrators would be too
limited in awarding acceptable terms in a final-offer system. 285  He
claims that this would be an unacceptable development because the
"paramount goal here [is] arriving at an acceptable first contract that
solves problems rather than selects winners." 2 86 Fiske counter-argues
that final-offer arbitration should be used because "FOA has an even
greater tendency than conventional interest arbitration to promote good
faith negotiations. .. ."287
The goal of American collective bargaining is a negotiated
settlement by the parties themselves.28 8  The arbitration system that
produces this result is the one that should be employed. As the social
science literature already reviewed suggests, without some risk of the
arbitration turning out badly, neither side will come to the table with
serious offers. 28 9  A lack of serious offers means that a negotiated
settlement by the two parties would be unlikely and the arbitrator would
write the contract-the exact result that collective bargaining hopes to
avoid. Fiske correctly cites to successful final-offer experiences in New
Jersey and experimental designs which show that FOA promotes a "more
even balance of power."290 Fiske does not discuss other critical real-
world examples which also support this position, especially when
contrasted with conventional arbitration. For example, after the state of
Michigan changed from a conventional arbitration system to a final-offer
system in 1969, the number of cases actually reaching arbitration
significantly declined, providing evidence for the theory that the parties
were seeking to negotiate their own awards. 29 1 A similar experience
occurred in the state of Oregon after it converted to FOA.2 92 In the final
two years of conventional arbitration, 1993 and 1994, 44 cases
285. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 345.
286. Id.
287. Fiske, supra note 9, at 75.
288. See H.K. Porter Co. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 103 (1970) ("The object of [the
NLRA] was ... to ensure that employers and their employees could work together to
establish mutually satisfactory conditions.").
289. See, e.g., Loewenberg, supra note 93, at 117-18; Meth, supra note 91, at 387;
Stevens, supra note 111, at 48.
290. Fiske, supra note 9, at 72-74.
291. See Howlett, supra note 112, at 827-28.
292. See Ronald L. Miller, High Risk Final Offer Interest Arbitration in Oregon, 28 J.
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS 265 (1999).
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eventually made it to arbitration.293 In the two years after FOA, that
number was more than cut in half to 2 1.294 Within Oregon, the city of
Eugene was the first municipality in the nation to use a final-offer
arbitration system.295 In a 1977 study that analyzed the first six years of
the Eugene system, the parties negotiated their own agreements
approximately two-thirds of the time.296 Arbitration was not invoked at
all in the later years of the study, leading one researcher to conclude,
"The Eugene experience suggests that over time the city's procedure has
become more rather than less effective in preserving the parties'
incentives to reach their own agreements. ... 297 Finally, in 1972, the
state of Wisconsin amended its public sector labor relations statue to
provide for final-offer arbitration, replacing a previous system of fact-
finding.298 In the initial years after FOA was implemented, arbitrators
were issuing awards on average in only nine percent of the cases where
they were eligible to do so.299 In about two-thirds of the cases the parties
directly negotiated the awards themselves. 30 0  For the remaining
instances, the parties reached an agreement during an intermediary
mediation stage before the arbitrator issued an award.o1 It should be
noted that a later study analyzing the 1974-1976 time period found that
14 percent of negotiations resulted in an arbitrated award, a small but
noticeable increase over previous years. 302 The author of that study
postulated that arbitration might have been used more often during that
time period because of "a more difficult economic environment for
bargaining."30 3
293. Id. at 276.
294. Id.
295. See Long and Feuille, supra note 97, at 187. The Eugene system was slightly
different from others already reviewed, in that both parties submitted two final offers,
with a total of four offers on the table. See id. at 192. The offers may constitute a
complete proposed contract (total-package) or may be limited to issues still in dispute
(issue by issue). See id. The Eugene system allowed for negotiations to continue even
after the final offers were submitted. See id. The parties could reach an agreement at any
time prior to the arbitrator's decision being rendered. See id.
296. See Peter Feuille, Final-Offer Arbitration and Negotiating Incentives, 32 ARB. J.
203, 208 (1977).
297. Id. at 209.
298. See James L. Stem, Final-Offer Arbitration-Initial Experience in Wisconsin,
MONTHLY LAB. REv., Sept. 1974, at 39, 39. While the parties retained the option of
invoking conventional arbitration, it was only used once, providing strong evidence that
both sides preferred final-offer. See id.
299. Id. at 40.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. See Feuille, supra note 296, at 210-11.
303. Id. at 211.
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Overall, the evidence from these states and municipalities tends to
support the hypothesis that final-offer arbitration provides the right
mixture of risk and reward to compel the parties to reach agreement
without using arbitration.304 The evidence above suggests that the fear of
a bad settlement under final-offer can bring the parties together and reach
their own independent agreement. Fiske's argument for final-offer
arbitration is preferable over Broderdorf s for conventional arbitration.
However, Fiske essentially argues that the case is closed.305 Her
analysis of this section is entitled "Interest Arbitration Will Work" 306
period. While the case is strong that FOA is better than conventional
arbitration, the limited amount of real-world economic data presently
available on this issue does not make an overwhelming or complete case.
The biggest flaw with all of this data is that it comes from the public
sector, which has a completely different purpose and value system than
the private sector. For instance, the private sector is driven by profits
and providing employment opportunities, whereas the public sector
provides services at a cost to taxpayers. If an arbitrator in the public
sector comes up with an unacceptable award, the state or municipality
can raise taxes. If that same arbitrator comes up with an unacceptable
award in the private sector, the company will likely go out of business
and jobs will be lost.
At the very least, it remains unclear which arbitration system would
truly work best in the private sector.3 07 While the final-offer arbitration
idea has significant merit, it would be unwise to institute it nation-wide
based upon the limited case studies reviewed above or experimental
designs from labor law academics. 308
2. Interest Arbitration Criteria
Beyond the question of final versus conventional arbitration is what
type of criteria arbitrators should use in reaching their decisions.
Broderdorf proposes that arbitrators use the following criteria: the
stipulation of the parties; the consumer price index (CPI); the comparison
of corresponding wages, benefits, and terms and conditions of
employment within the firm and with comparable firms or industries in
geographic areas with similar economic conditions; the financial
condition of the employer and its ability to incur changes in labor costs;
304. See, e.g., Howlett, supra note 112, at 827-28; Long and Feuille, supra note 99, at
187; Stern, supra note 298, at 40.
305. See generally Fiske, supra note 9, at 65-74.
306. See id. at 65.
307. The author will readily concede that Broderdorf might be right and conventional
arbitration is the more appropriate arbitration system.
308. Fiske, supra note 9, at 74.
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and industry best practices in labor relationships for fostering labor-
management partnership, including joint initiatives to improve employee
engagement, satisfaction, productivity, and overall business success. 309
Fiske does not argue strongly for any specific criteria, instead relying on
commonly used criteria from the public sector.3 '0 But like Broderdorf,
she favorably cites a broad catch-all category of "any other factors that
are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the
determination of wages, hours, and conditions of employment."311
The first four criteria that Broderdorf proposes are not problematic.
However, the final criteria from Broderdorf and Fiske's broad catch-all
category give arbitrators too much freedom to craft a contract. What is
an "industry best practice" that "fosters [a] labor-management
relationship" or "any other factor that [is] normally or traditionally taken
into consideration" can vary from arbitrator to arbitrator, based upon
their respective background, familiarity with the industry or unions
involved, and subjective judgments about the broader role of labor
unions and employers. Any criteria used must strictly limit the
arbitrator's ability in crafting an award. No need exists for a broad
"catch-all" category that would give arbitrators unfettered power. Such
"catch-all" categories have also been problematic in other employment
related legislation, most notably the Employment Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). 312  The civil enforcement provision of ERISA
allows for "a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary to enjoin any act or
practice which violates any provision . .. or to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief."3 13 Even though this "catch-all" would at first seem to
afford generous relief, the Supreme Court has struggled with the breadth
to afford this provision and what types of relief should be available to
petitioners.3 14 Given this experience, a strong likelihood exists that the
courts and FMCS would struggle with how to interpret a "catch-all"
provision.
It is also worth noting that even if strict criteria are part of the final
legislation, arbitrators might ignore them anyway. A study of arbitrators
in Wisconsin found that 15 out of 22 arbitrators said that statutorily
309. Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 345-47.
310. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 66.
311. Id.
312. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
313. 29U.S.C.§ 1132.
314. See Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson, 534 U.S. 204 (2002)
(limiting equitable relief to equitable restitution); Mertens v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248
(1993) (limiting relief under ERISA to equitable relief because "equitable relief must
mean something less than all relief').
315. This assumes that EFCA allows for judicial review of arbitrator awards. As
EFCA presently stands, no judicial review provision is incorporated into the law.
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defined criteria would not impact their decision-making. 6 An arbitrator
explained this result by saying "A common law has developed in interest
arbitration and the same criteria would be used with or without them
stated in the statue."1 Criteria might actually be unimportant when
arbitrators are just going to do whatever they desire according to this
vague idea of "interest arbitration common law." While Fiske does not
find this problematic, 318  this common law of arbitration affords
arbitrators enormous discretion and there is no guarantee, as the earlier
319Wal-Mart tire shop demonstrates, that arbitrators will always employ it
wisely. The prospect of rogue arbitrators ignoring legislatively enacted
criteria is even stronger evidence that the entire interest arbitration
venture is misguided.
3. Limiting Interest Arbitration to Bad-Faith Bargaining
Broderdorf's final suggestion is that interest arbitration should only
be used for situations involving bad-faith bargaining by the parties.3 20
Bad-faith bargaining is a violation of Section 8(a)(5) 321 of the NLRA and
can result in an unfair labor practice charge against the employer. Fiske
argues against this provision, claiming that only using interest arbitration
in bad-faith circumstances will be ineffective because employers will
still have an incentive to engage in bad-faith bargaining.322 She believes
that the legal proceedings necessary to prove a bad-faith bargaining
charge are too lengthy. 32 3
While limiting interest arbitration to bad-faith bargaining seems like
a reasonable requirement and could punish employers that violate labor
laws, the difference between "bad-faith" bargaining and "good-faith"
bargaining is tenuous. The board employs a "totality of the
circumstances" test to differentiate between the two.3 24 As Broderdorf
concedes, many times when labor unions complain of "bad-faith"
316. See Gregory G. Dell'Omo, Wage Disputes in Interest Arbitration: Arbitrators
Weigh the Criteria, ARB. J., June 1989, at 4, 11. These 22 arbitrators were the most
widely used in Wisconsin, deciding approximately 82 percent of all arbitrations in the
state between 1979 and 1985. See id. at 5 n.5.
317. See id. at 11. Reassuringly, the study found that the "common law" criteria that
arbitrators follow are rather conventional. See id. at 8. The criteria used by the
arbitrators were internal wage settlement patterns, followed by external comparability,
and then cost of living as a "tie breaker." See id.
318. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 66 n.92.
319. See Moore, supra note 203, at 4.
320. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 333-35.
321. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
322. See Fiske, supra note 9, at 79-80.
323. See id.
324. See, e.g., NLRB v. Advanced Bus. Forms Corp., 474 F.2d 457, 466 (2d Cir.
1973).
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bargaining, the situation is not "bad-faith" bargaining at all but instead a
company simply negotiating from a position of bargaining strength.3 25
Whether bargaining is in good faith or bad faith is highly subjective. If
all that triggers interest arbitration is a charge of bad-faith bargaining,
unions might resort to this tactic even when the employer is only
engaging in good-faith bargaining. FMCS and possibly the courts will
be in the unenviable position of judging whether every negotiation is in
good-faith or bad-faith. Thus, while this suggestion seems
straightforward, limiting interest arbitration to bad-faith bargaining might
not completely solve the problem that it seeks to address.
Fiske is correct that proving a bad-faith bargaining charge can take
time, which could dissuade unions from pursuing this avenue. But if all
bad-faith bargaining charges were quickly adjudicated outside of the
normal NLRB timetable, unions would have an even greater incentive to
excessively file bad-faith bargaining charges.326 In the same vein,
Fiske's alternative of allowing interest arbitration in every circumstance
is even worse, because, as Broderdorf notes, it would "artificially
enhance a union's power by guaranteeing a contract not earned through
traditional negotiations."327 This essentially tilts the playing field in
labor's favor, which poses a serious problem as previously discussed.3 28
At the very least, interest arbitration should be limited to bad faith
bargaining. However, even then, unions would have a strong incentive
to abuse the bad faith/good faith distinction, a possibility which again
demonstrates the shortcomings of interest arbitration.
VIII.CONCLUSION
The Employee Free Choice Act and interest arbitration are hotly
contested, emotional issues. While I am clearly skeptical of many of
labor's arguments in favor of interest arbitration, my larger concern is
two-fold: first, that Congress is passing legislation that will
tremendously impact the private sector based upon indirect comparisons
with the public sector; and second, that Congress has not properly
considered all of the complicated issues that surround the type of interest
arbitration that EFCA envisions. If Congress wanted to seriously change
325. See Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 333 ("Second, of the roughly 32 percent of
newly organized employees that do not achieve a first contract, a portion of those
corresponding employers may be engaging in good faith bargaining. . . .").
326. While Fiske complains of delays from the NLRB and the courts, a careful review
of the facts and circumstances of each specific case is actually a desirable virtue in legal
proceedings, as is the right to appeal to a higher court for judicial review. See Fiske,
supra note 9, at 79-80.
327. Broderdorf, supra note 9, at 334.
328. See supra pp. 50-56.
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contract negotiations for the better, it would consider many of these hard
details in much greater depth. But the congressional hearings on EFCA
have not explored most of the issues presented in this Comment and
other law review articles cited, such as whether FMCS should use
conventional or FOA arbitration. Indeed, Epstein has correctly noted
that a "conspiracy of silence" seems to publicly exist amongst those in
favor of interest arbitration.3 2 9 The lack of robust debate has led to a
sentiment by many in management that Congress is not sincerely
interested in improving labor relations but is passing this legislation for
one reason: organized labor asked and organized labor largely funds
Democratic political campaigns. 330  Such a large-scale change in the
private sector should not be implemented because of political cronyism.
To the contrary, Congress should more fully explore all of the facets of
interest arbitration including the wide-ranging impact that interest
arbitration would have on companies and labor unions, and whether
indirect comparisons with the public sector truly predict interest
arbitration's effect in the private sector. Congress should only
implement interest arbitration after it has more carefully considered all of
these issues. The American worker, caught in the cross-hairs between
labor and management on this issue and whose well-being should
ultimately decide the outcome of this debate, deserves nothing less.
329. See Epstein, supra note 3, at 17. While Fiske's contribution strongly defends
interest arbitration and might break this silence, her article was not published until late
2009, six years after interest arbitration was first proposed. See generally Fiske, supra
note 9, at 47. Her article is also the only major law review article defending EFCA's
specific interest arbitration provision that the author could locate.
330. This strategy might also be unwise for the Democratic Party, as they risk
offending centrist and pro-business Democrats.
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